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Abstract
Discretely-constrained Nash-Cournot games have attracted attention as they arise in various com-
petitive energy production settings in which players must make one or more discrete decisions. Gabriel
et al. [2] claim that the set of equilibria to a discretely-constrained Nash-Cournot game coincides with
the set of solutions to a corresponding discretely-constrained mixed complementarity problem. We show
that this claim is false.
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1 Introduction
A Nash-Cournot game is a game-theoretical framework of imperfect competition in which multiple produc-
ers/players compete to optimize their individual objective functions, which also depend on other players’
production decisions. Traditional (i.e., purely continuous) Nash-Cournot problems have been extensively
studied and it is well known that they can be expressed either as nonlinear complementarity or variational
inequality problems [1]. Discretely-constrained Nash-Cournot (DC-NC) games arise when a subset of a
player’s decisions are required to be discrete, for example, when a player must make a binary on/off deci-
sion. Gabriel et al. [2] approached discretely-constrained Nash-Cournot games by framing the problem as a
discretely-constrained mixed complementarity problem (DC-MCP).
We consider the same set up and, to the extent possible, the same notation as Gabriel et al. [2]. There
are N players indexed by p ∈ P = {1, . . . , N}. Player p optimizes her cost function fp : Rn 7→ R that
depends on her decision vector xp ∈ Rnp and the vector x−p = (x1, . . . ,xp−1,xp+1, . . . ,xN ) denoting the
decisions of all other players besides player p. Here, n =
∑
p∈P np. Specifically, we assume that player p
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solves the following discretely-constrained optimization problem parameterized by x−p:
f∗p (x−p) = min
xp
fp(xp,x−p) [dual vars] (1a)
s.t. gpj(xp) ≤ 0 [λpj ≥ 0] ∀j ∈ Ip (1b)
hpk(xp) = 0 [γpk ∈ R] ∀k ∈ Ep (1c)
xp ≥ 0 (1d)
xpr ∈ Z+ ∀r ∈ Dp , (1e)
where Ip, Ep, and Dp denote the set of inequalities, equalities, and integer variables for player p ∈ P . Let
Xp = {xp ∈ Rnp : (1b), (1c), (1d), (1e)} denote the discretely-constrained feasible region for player p ∈ P and
let Cp = {xp ∈ R
np : (1b), (1c), (1d)} denote the continuous relaxation of Xp. A vector xˆ is called a Nash
equilibrium of this DC-NC game if xˆp ∈ Xp for all p ∈ P and
fp(xˆp, xˆ−p) ≤ fp(xp, xˆ−p), ∀p ∈ P ,xp ∈ Xp . (2)
Gabriel et al. [2] approach convex DC-NC games, i.e., games in which the continuous relaxation of
each player’s optimization problem is a convex optimization problem, by applying the following four-step
procedure: 1) relax the integrality constraints for each player; 2) write the KKT conditions for each player; 3)
re-impose the integrality constraints; 4) solve the resulting DC-MCP. More concretely, since KKT conditions
are neither necessary nor sufficient for a discrete optimization problem, Gabriel et al. [2] attempt to find
the set of Nash equilibria to (2) by appealing to the continuous relaxation of each player’s parametric
optimization problem:
min
{
fp(xp,x−p) : xp ∈ Cp
}
. (3)
Assume that the functions fp(·,x−p) are convex and a constraint qualification for the continuous relaxation
Cp holds. Then, the KKT conditions for player p’s relaxed problem (3) are to find xp ∈ Rnp , λp ∈ R|Ip|,
γp ∈ R|Ep| such that
0 ≤ ∇xpfp(xp,x−p) +
∑
j∈Ip
λpj∇gpj(xp) +
∑
k∈Ep
γpk∇hpk(xp) ⊥ xp ≥ 0 (4a)
0 ≤ −gpj(xp,x−p) ⊥ λpj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ Ip (4b)
hpk(xp,x−p) = 0 , γpk ∈ R ∀k ∈ Ep (4c)
Gabriel et al. [2] (p.313) then write:
“An interesting question is whether the set of xp that solves (4), but with the discrete restrictions
for xpr ∈ Z+ for r ∈ Dp, corresponds to the solution set of the original problem (2). The next
result shows that this correspondence is correct.”
Theorem 1 (Theorem 3 in [2]) Let SDC-Nash be the set of solutions to the discretely-constrained Nash-
Cournot game (2) and SDC-MCP be the set of solutions to (4) for which xpr ∈ Z+ for r ∈ Dp. Then,
SDC-Nash = SDC-MCP.
2 Counterexamples
We now provide two simple discretely-constrained Nash-Cournot duopoly games (i.e., P = {1, 2}) for which
one or more equilibria exist to (2), but the complementarity conditions coupled with integrality restrictions
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are either 1) empty, or 2) non-empty, but a strict subset of the true set of equilibria. In both examples,
because each player controls a single decision variable, we index player p’s decision variable as xp rather than
xp1.
2.1 “Linear” players with weak continuous relaxations
Consider the simple Nash-Cournot duopoly game with the following symmetric payoff matrix:
x2 = 0 x2 = 1
x1 = 0 0 -1
x1 = 1 -1 -2
Here each player can take a discrete (binary) action with the unique equilibrium being x1 = x2 = 1, i.e., each
player chooses action 1 for a (minimum) payoff of -2, which is obviously a dominant strategy for each player.
We now translate this DC-NC game into an optimization framework. Suppose player p ∈ {1, 2} solves the
following problem:
f∗p (x−p) = min
{
− xp − x−p : xp ∈ [0, 1 + ǫ] ∩ Z
}
, (5)
where ǫ > 0 and Z is the set of integers. The corresponding KKT optimality conditions are
0 ≤ λp − 1 ⊥ xp ≥ 0 ∀p (6a)
0 ≤ 1 + ǫ− xp ⊥ λp ≥ 0 ∀p (6b)
We now plug in the unique equilibrium solution x1 = x2 = 1. Complementarity conditions (6a) imply that
λp = 1, while conditions (6b) imply that λp = 0. This contradiction reveals that the unique equilibrium
solution x1 = x2 = 1 is not in SDC-MCP, i.e. ∅ = SDC-MCP ⊂ SDC-Nash 6= ∅.
2.2 “Quadratic” players with tight continuous relaxations
In this example, the continuous relaxation for each player is tight. Consider the payoff matrix
x2 = 0 x2 = 1
x1 = 0 (0, 0) (9, 9)
x1 = 1 (4, 4) (1, 1− δ)
For δ > −3, there are two equilibria in pure strategies: (x1, x2) = (0, 0) and (x1, x2) = (1, 1).
This corresponds to player 1 solving the following convex quadratic problem (as a function of x2):
f∗1 (x2) = min
x1
(2x1 − 3x2)
2 (7a)
s.t. x1 − 1 ≤ 0 (7b)
− x1 ≤ 0 (7c)
Meanwhile, player 2 solves a similar convex quadratic problem (as a function of x1):
f∗2 (x1) = min
x2
(2x1 − 3x2)
2 − δx1x2 (8a)
s.t. x2 − 1 ≤ 0 (8b)
− x2 ≤ 0 (8c)
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Note that fp(·,x−p) are convex functions and a constraint qualification holds.
The KKT conditions (4) become
0 ≤ 4(2x1 − 3x2) + λ1 ⊥ x1 ≥ 0 (9a)
0 ≤ −6(2x1 − 3x2)− δx1 + λ2 ⊥ x2 ≥ 0 (9b)
0 ≤ 1− xp ⊥ λp ≥ 0 ∀p (9c)
Assume δ > −3. It is straightforward to verify that xp = λp = 0 for all p satisfy the complementarity
conditions (9). The situation is different for (x1, x2) = (1, 1). Condition (9a) implies that λ1 = 4, while
condition (9c) implies that λp ≥ 0 for all p. However, condition (9b) implies that λ2 = −6 + δ. Thus,
for δ ∈ (−3, 6), the complementarity approach fails to recognize (x1, x2) = (1, 1) as an equilibrium. It
it tempting to argue that when δ ∈ (−3, 1], this omission is not a concern because (x1, x2) = (0, 0) is
the preferred equilibrium (i.e., the global minimizer for both players). However, for δ > 1, player 2’s global
minimizer is (x1, x2) = (1, 1) with a payoff of 1−δ and, for δ ∈ (1, 6), the complementarity approach does not
“see” this solution as an equilibrium. In short, this example shows that, not only can the complementarity
approach fail to find all equilibria to a DC-NC game, it is not guaranteed to find global optima for each
player when it does return an equilibrium.
Note that one can obtain a similar result (counterexample) by replacing the L2 term (2x1 − 3x2)2 with
the L1 term |2x1−3x2| so that each player solves a linear optimization problem instead of a convex quadratic
one.
3 Resolution
For completeness, the correct version of Theorem 3 in Gabriel et al. is
Theorem 2 Let SDC-Nash be the set of solutions to the discretely-constrained Nash-Cournot game (2) and
SDC-MCP be the set of solutions to (4) for which xpr ∈ Z+ for r ∈ Dp. Then, SDC-MCP ⊆ SDC-Nash and
there exist cases when SDC-MCP ( SDC-Nash.
Finally, note that the heuristic proposed by Gabriel et al. to solve the DC-NC game (2) is still valid.
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